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1. INTRODUCTION 
Air transport is a complex system combining 
advanced technical systems, operators (air traffic 
controllers, pilots) and procedures. All these 
elements work in a large spatial dispersion, but are 
closely interrelated. They interact, and the time 
horizon of these interactions is very short. In 
aviation, the risk is traditionally identified with the 
air accident, which typically produce a high number 
of deaths and huge financial losses. Severity of the 
consequences is the reason why the safety was 
always a key value in this mode of transport. 
Polish aviation regulations define three 
categories of air events [1]: 
 accident - as an event associated with the 
operation of the aircraft, which occurred in 
the presence of people on board, during 
which any person has suffered at least of 
serious injuries or aircraft was damaged, 
 serious incident - as an incident whose 
circumstances indicate that there was almost 
an accident (such as a significant violation of 
the separation between aircraft, without the 
control of the situation both by the pilot of 
the aircraft and the controller) 
 incident - as an event associated with the 
operation of an aircraft other than an 
accident, which would adversely affect the 
safety of operation (e.g. a violation of 
separation, but with the control of the 
situation). 
 
The European Organization for the Safety of Air 
Navigation Eurocontrol issued six documents 
relating to safety standards, called the ESARR 
requirements. In air transport the last few years 
resulted in attempts to standardize the methods and 
tools of risk management, particularly in 
determining the acceptable (tolerable, target) level 
of safety [9]. Currently, European aviation 
authorities use safety minimums set by the ECAC 
(European Civil Aviation Conference) which were 
adopted by Eurocontrol in ESARR-4 regulations. 
Since 2005 they have been obligatory in Poland as 
well. The ESARR-4 regulations divide the events 
with the participation of ATM (Air Traffic 
Management) into 5 categories denoting an 
acceptable level of safety only for the category of 
"accidents". TLS (Target Level of Safety) defines 
the maximum value of probability of an accident, 
for the commercial aircraft, to be equal 1,55 · 10–8 
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accident on a flight hour, or 2,31 · 10–8 accident on 
a flight [5]. 
All ECAC member states are obliged to 
designate the so called CLS (Current Level of 
Safety) and compare it to TLS. It is also necessary 
to make a forecast of changes in the level of safety 
in future years and to propose possible remedies (in 
case of excess of acceptable standards). 
 This task is substantially difficult because the 
TLS concept is based on the number of accidents 
with regard to the volume of traffic. In many 
countries, however, there have been no air accidents 
in recent years. That is also a situation in Poland. In 
this case, a reliable determination of the required 
CLS value is impossible. 
One method of solving this problem is to use 
data on air incidents, which are obviously more 
frequent than air accidents. If the value of the CLS 
determined based on incidents is within the limits 
specified for the accident, it is assumed that this is a 
satisfactory result, not requiring further research or 
action [4]. Such an approach, although it seems to 
be reasonable, can be subjected to criticism. It may 
in fact result in conviction of the high level of 
safety, when in fact situation is different. With not 
so big number of flights (not so many flight hours), 
which takes into account, one may find that the 
existence of only one case of air accident will result 
in a safety level worse than the required TLS. Such 
a situation occurs also in Poland. According to 
statistics from the Civil Aviation Authority [3], in 
2009 there were 165.000 flight hours in whole 
Polish civil aviation. If only one accident of 
commercial aircraft had occurred, the  CLS could 
be estimated at , which is much more 
than recommended by Eurocontrol value of 
. 
In this paper a different approach is proposed. 
Serious air traffic incidents should be analyzed and 
used to determine the probability of transforming 
them into accidents. If there is any regular 
statistical relationship between incidents and 
accidents, then on the basis of serious incidents 
statistics, one can make a forecast of the number of 
accidents and thus determine the value of the CLS. 
In this article an attempt to find such a relationship 
is presented. For air traffic events modeling, Petri 
nets are used. 
 
 
2. RISK IN AIR TRAFFIC 
The risk in air traffic can be divided into 
conscious and unconscious. The first case 
(conscious risk) is when, despite the possibility of 
avoiding it, we decide to undertake the risky action. 
The unintentional (passive, unconscious) risk exists 
independently of our will or decision. For example, 
the decision to travel by air transport is associated 
with additional exposure to loss of life or health 
(conscious risk), while living near the airport, where 
there is a risk of loss of life due to airplane crash, 
represents a unconscious risk.  
The risk may relate to objectively or subjectively 
known exposure to hazards, with a probability 
dependent on time, place, person, etc. There may be 
the risk of a global (e.g. climate change) or local 
(e.g. aircraft noise) nature. Certain groups of people 
are more vulnerable to the same type of risk than 
others, for example, aircraft pilots and passengers.  
Depending on the duration of the threat we have 
to deal with continuous, single or cumulative risk 
[6]. And social risk can be divided into four types 
[8]: 
 real risk, which can be determined based on 
the analysis of sequence of faults leading to 
adverse event, 
 statistical risk, calculated on the basis of 
available data about previous events, 
 anticipated risk, which can be predicted 
analytically based on models, 
 perceived risk, which is felt intuitively. 
 
Aviation, in particular air traffic management, is 
the human activity, which includes all four types of 
social risk. Insurance companies will look for air 
transport in terms of statistical risk, the passengers 
- the perceived risk, which for most people is 
greater than the statistical risk. Air traffic 
management will be mostly focused on the 
anticipated risk, determined by modeling the effects 
of introducing new organizational and technical 
systems. 
Accidents in air traffic, characterized with 
respect to the risk, have several distinctive features: 
 passengers and crew members are the people 
who are mostly vulnerable to risk, but there 
are also people on earth who are exposed to 
the same effect, but with significantly less 
probability, 
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 accidents are extremely rare events (in 
absolute sense), but with very serious 
consequences, 
 risk is always present (with respect to time of 
flight), so we have to deal with non-
cumulative risk. 
 
Practical problem in air traffic is managing the 
risk and safety. It is usually resolved by examining 
the causes of incidents and accidents, determining 
risks associated with them and then determining 
(setting) standards, corresponding to the socially 
acceptable values. Determining the risk of accidents 
is an essential task, which can be implemented in 
various ways, ranging from very intuitive to a 
strictly formal (analytical), but is usually divided 
into several sub-tasks: 
 identification of risk: the emergence of new 
risks or changes in traffic parameters, which 
change the current risk assessment, 
 risk assessment: determination of the degree 
of risk aversion and the degree of acceptance 
of risk, 
 dimensioning of risk: usually as the number 
of accidents per unit time (or distance or  
number of flights). 
 
As far as now a lot of methods and models on 
different aspects of risk management in air traffic 
have been developed. The models to study the 
causes of actual, real incidents and accidents seem 
to be the most advanced. These are usually the 
methods used for other types of risky human 
activities, and only implemented for air traffic. 
The second group consists of methods and 
models to assess the theoretical risk of possible 
collisions in air traffic. Although such collisions are 
rare, but their implications are very serious, so the 
development of such methods seems necessary. 
Since they concern the possibility of an accident, so 
it's kind of proactive thinking, aimed at preventing 
incidents in air traffic before they happen. 
The third group are the methods of human errors 
analysis. Aviation accidents statistics indicates that 
the most common reasons for their occurrence are 
the errors of air traffic controllers and pilots. 
Finding the causes of these errors is difficult and an 
interdisciplinary task. However they need 
examination and risk assessment, especially since 
the man is just one element of a more complex  
man-machine system as air traffic management 
system. 
The last group of risk analysis methods, are the 
third-party risk methods. While the statistical risk 
of losing life on the earth by an aircraft accident is 
much less than in the case of passengers, but 
socially perceived risk appears to be high. Those 
methods should be taken into consideration when 
choosing the location of the planned or upgraded 
airports. 
 
3. METHOD OF ANALYSIS OF THE 
RELATION BETWEEN SERIOUS AIR 
TRAFFIC INCIDENT AND ACCIDENT 
As it is widely known, the air traffic incidents 
are almost always a result of a combination of 
many different factors. During the development of a 
dangerous situation in time, there are also inhibitory 
factors that hinder or prevent this process. 
Preliminary analysis of the various events in air 
traffic indicates that for the events classified as 
serious incidents, there would be sufficient 
occurrence of only one additional conducive factor, 
or the termination of only one inhibiting factor, to a 
serious incident turned into an accident. This 
observation is the basis for proposing the following 
method of analysis. 
 
3.1.  PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE 
ANALYSIS 
While analyzing risk of serious incidents, with 
the use of event tree or fault tree, there are many 
elements which probabilities we do not know. In 
addition, events are dependent (in the probabilistic 
sense), what makes analysis more difficult. The 
method presented in this paper is based on 
analyzing only those additional factors that 
determine the creation of the accident. This 
definitely reduces the scope of analysis and also 
reduces the uncertainty of risk estimation. At the 
same time, this approach is adequate to achieve the 
goals of analysis - to determine the statistical 
dependencies between a serious incident and the air 
accident. As a result of finding such a relationship, 
it would be possible to estimate the number of 
accidents just on the basis of knowledge of the 
number of incidents. 
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3.2. PETRI NETS 
Petri net is described as [7]: 
 N={P,T,I,O,H} (1) 
where: 
P - set of places 
T - set of transitions, T  P =  
I, O, H, are functions respectively of input, output 
and inhibitors: 
I, O, H: T → Bag (P) 
where Bag (P) is the superset over the set P. 
Given a transition Tt  it can be defined: 
t  = {p  P : I(t,p) > 0} - input set of transition t 
t  = {p  P : O(t,p) > 0} - output set of transition t 
t = {p  P : H(t,p) > 0} - inhibition set of 
transition t 
Petri nets system is described as: 
 S={P,T,I,O,H,Mo}  (2) 
where 
P - set of places 
T - set of transitions, T  P =  
I, O, H, are functions respectively of input, output 
and inhibitors: 
I, O, H: T → Bag (P) 
where Bag (P) is the set of all possible supersets 
over the set P. 
M0: P → N is the initial marking, i.e. a function 
assigning an integer to each place. 
Petri network model is described as: 
M={P,T,I,O,H,PAR,PRED,MP}        (3) 
where: 
P - set of places 
T - set of transitions, 
I, O, H, are functions respectively of input, output 
and inhibitors: 
I, O, H: T → Bag (P) 
where Bag (P) is the superset over the set P, 
PAR - a set of parameters, 
PRED - a set of predicates limiting the range of 
parameters, 
MP:P→N  PAR - a function that assigns to each 
of places the natural number or the parameter value 
from the set of natural numbers. 




Firing of transition t, active in marking M will 
change actual marking to M  such that 
M’ = M + O(t) – I(t)                       (5) 
This relationship is written briefly M[t>M’. We 
then say that M’ is reachable directly from M. If the 
transition requires firing a sequence of sub-
transitions σ, then we say that M’ is reachable from 
M and denote M M’. 
For each Petri net we can determine: the 
reachability graph, evaluate the reversibility, the 
presence of deadlock, liveness, and boundedness. In 
the presented method of analysis, the most 
important property of the network (modeling an air 
incident) is the reachability of selected states 
(markings) from initial marking M0. It allows to 
assess the probability and transition time for those 
selected markings. 
 
3.3. OUTLINE OF PROPOSED METHOD 
In the method presented in this paper the 
following interpretation was adopted: 
 The set P corresponds to traffic situations. 
These situations are referred to both the 
location of a plane in the airspace, as well as 
issue of specific permits (clearances). The set 
P may include, for example, situations such 
as: aircraft ready for take-off, occupied 
runway, the plane at the intersection of the 
runways, taxiing started, etc. Additional 
elements of this set are situations describing 
the state of the environment, such as: the 
occurrence of more than 1000 meters of 
visibility, ATC controller busy, the pilot of 
another aircraft watches the situation on the 
maneuvering area etc. 
 The set T corresponds to the set of events 
(actions) that change the traffic situation, 
particularly affecting the safety of 
maneuvers. These are events such as: ATC 
controller allows the start, the plane taxiing 
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at a certain taxiway, the plane does not stop 
the actual maneuver. These events can be 
characterized by two values: the time of their 
duration (including the important role played 
by the zero-time events, the so-called 
immediate events) and a priority, defined by 
the probability of realization of events that 
can occur simultaneously. 
 The input function I defines the traffic 
situations that determine occurrence of 
certain events, output function O defines 
what event (action) must occur to change the 
status of the analyzed system, and the 
inhibitor function H specifies the traffic 
situations that must not exist to certain 
events can occur. 
 The initial marking M0 defines the traffic 
situation in which we begin the analysis, and 
the current marking M describes the current 
state of the system (process). 
 
The analysis, which aims to determine the 
relationship between serious incident and accident 
in air traffic, consists in carrying out the simulation 
of the process modeled by a suitable Petri net, 
together with recording the time and the probability 
of staying in each state. General algorithm of the 
method is as follows: 
 Development of a model of a serious air 
traffic incident as a Petri net. It is necessary 
to take into account all the events (leading to 
or inhibiting the incident) and time relations 
between them. 
 Reduction of the network, which consists in  
elimination of places and transitions that do 
not affect the transformation of the incident 
into accident. 
 Development of the scenarios of transforming  
an incident into accident. These scenarios 
must take into account both the appearance 
of additional events and absence of inhibiting 
events. 
 Development of a model of an accident, 
taking into account reduction of the network 
and all the possible scenarios as defined in 
previous section. 
 Simulation of the process, with registration 
of system states, time spent in specific states, 
the average number of markers in each place. 
 Isolation of system states representing the 
transformation of the incident into accident, 




4. EXAMPLE ANALYSIS – SERIOUS AIR 
TRAFFIC INCIDENT 344/07 
As an example illustrating the method a serious 
air traffic incident which occurred in August 2007 
at Warsaw airport will be presented. Its participants 
were Boeing 767 and Boeing 737 aircraft, ant its  
cause was classified as a "human factor" and the 
causal group H4 - "procedural errors" [2]. 
 
4.1. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE SERIOUS 
INCIDENT 
In the incident on 13 August 2007 two aircraft 
participated – Boeing 737 (B737) and Boeing 767 
(B767), which more or less at the same time were 
scheduled for take-off from the Warsaw-Okęcie 
airport. As the first, clearance for line-up and wait 
on runway RWY 29 was issued to B737. As a 
second, clearance for line-up and wait on runway 
RWY 33 was given to B767 crew. The latter 
aircraft was also the first to obtain permission to 
take-off. A moment after confirmation of 
permission to take-off, both aircraft began starting 
procedure at the same time. B737 crew assumed 
that the start permission was addressed to them. 
They probably thought, that since they first 
received permission to line up the runway, they are 
also the first to be permitted to start. In addition, 
the categories of wake turbulence caused, that it 
would be better to start B737 before B767, from the 
traffic point of view. Decision of the controller, 
however, was different. An air traffic controller 
(ATC) did not watch planes take-off, because at 
this time he was busy agreeing helicopter take-off. 
The situation of simultaneous start was observed by 
the pilot of ATR 72, which was standing in queue 
for departure. He reacted on the radio. After this 
message, B767 pilot looked right and saw B737 
taking-off. Then, on his own initiative, he broke off 
and began a rapid deceleration, which led to 
stopping the plane 200 meters from the intersection 
of the runways. Assistant controller heard the ATR 
72 pilot radio message and informed the controller 
that  B737 operated without authorization. A 
controller, who originally did not hear the 
information by radio, after 16 seconds from the 
start, recognized the situation and strongly ordered 
B737 to discontinue take-off procedure. B737 crew 
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performed braking and stopped 200 m from the 
intersection of the runways. 
 
4.2. MODEL OF SERIOUS INCIDENT 
This air traffic incident almost led to collision 
between the two aircraft, it means to accident. As in 
most such situations, there were many factors 
contributing to the creation of this dangerous 
situation. The most important were: 
 lack of situational awareness at the B737 
crew, 
 inadequate monitoring at radio 
communications and, consequently, wrong 
acceptance of permission for the start, in fact 
directed to another plane, 
 lack of the crew cooperation in the B737 
cockpit, 
 lack of proper monitoring of the take-off by 
the controller, 
 controller's lack of response to the 
information from the pilot of ATR 72 
transmitted by radio. 
 
The factors impeding the development of the 
accident, which resulted in preventing it, included: 
 good assessment of dangerous situation by 
the crew of B767 and decision to 
immediately discontinue take-off, 
 good recognition of the hazard by the crew of 
the ATR 72 and immediate sending a 
message by radio, 
 good weather conditions for visual 
observation of the runways, 
 proper response of assistant controller. 
 
Petri net model representing this serious incident 
is shown in Figure 1.
 
Figure 1. The basic model of a serious air traffic incident 344/07
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4.3. MODEL OF AIR TRAFFIC 
     ACCIDENT 
Analysis of the factors leading to the incident 
may give an answer to the question what is the 
probability of such incident. In this case, such an 
analysis can be very interesting. It is, for example, 
to check how the situation would change if it was 
B767 the first aircraft to obtain permission to line 
up the runway. In this case the crew of the B737 
would not have a reason to accept a permission 
issued for the B767. 
In the presented method, however, a goal is to  
find a probabilistic dependence between the serious 
incident and an accident that could result from it. In 
this case, it is necessary to notice that it is sufficient 
that there exists only one additional factor, and 
incident would in fact be an accident. There are 
several scenarios that lead to an accident. 
1. B767 crew, busy with their own take-off 
procedure does not pay attention to the 
message transmitted by radio by the ATR 
72 pilot. 
2. B767 crew takes a wrong decision to 
continue the take-off, despite noting B737 
aircraft. Such a decision could arise, for 
example, with this reasoning: "there is no 
possibility to stop before the intersection, 
let B737 stop - after all, we have a 
permission to start, maybe we can pass the 
intersection before the B737, etc.". 
3. ATR 72 pilot does not watch the situation 
on the runways, just waiting for permission 
to line-up the runway. 
4. ATR 72 pilot observes a dangerous 
situation, but does not immediately inform 
about it on the radio, instead discusses it 
with other members of his own crew. 
5. Assistant controller does not pay attention 
to the information given by radio by the 
ATR 72 pilot, or does not respond to it 
properly - does not inform the controller. 
6. Weather conditions (visibility) are so bad 
that it is impossible to see the actual traffic 
situation. This applies to B767, ATR 72 
crews, and the air traffic controller. 
 
All these scenarios will lead with certainty (or 
with great probability) to transformation of the 
incident into an accident, and will be analyzed using 
Petri net model. In this analysis one should take into 
account the possibility of occurrence of each 
scenario separately, as well as several of them at 
once. 
 
4.4. Probability of incident-accident  
   transformation 
Analysis of the probability of transformation of 
incident into an accident must take into account the 
probability of each scenario mentioned above. 
Designation of some of these probabilities is very 
difficult or even impossible, because of the lack of 
statistical data, or it is even not possible to measure 
some values. In the case of scenario 6 we can use 
statistical data on meteorological conditions 
(visibility) in the airport. But in other scenarios, it 
is necessary to refer to experts' evaluation. 
Taking into account the objectives of the 
analysis, it is possible to eliminate certain states 
without loss of accuracy, while simplifying the 
analyzed model. This applies, for example, to 
almost all the places and transitions associated with 
the process of taxing and lining up the runway. For 
example, change the set of places is determined as 
follows.   
  
 Pw = (P  Pr)  Pd                       (6) 
where 
Pw - a set of places in the modeled accident, 
Pr - a set of reduced places, 
Pd - a set of places added to the model, to reflect the 
above-mentioned scenarios. 
In this case (Fig. 1) 
 
Pr={p1, p2, …,p11}                      (7) 
 
where: p1 - B767 awaiting permission to start, p2 - 
B767 can line up RWY 33, p3 - B767 on the RWY 
33 threshold, p4 - B767 ready for take-off, p5 - 
B737 awaiting permission to start, p6 - B737 can 
line up RWY 29 , p7 - B737 on the RWY 29 
threshold, p8 - B737 ready for take-off, p9 - ATC 
not busy, p10 - ATC busy, p11 - ATR observes a 
simultaneous start. 
On the other hand 
Pd={p12, p13, …,p21}                      (8) 
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where: p12 - ATR warns?, p13 - B737 continues to 
start, p14 – B737 at the crossing, p15 - B767 hears 
the warning?, p16 - B767 continues to start, p17 - 
B767 at the crossing, p18 - B767 interrupts start?, 
p19 - B767 begins deceleration, p20 - weather?, p21 - 
good visibility. 
A similar modification was made in regard to 
transitions, input, output and inhibition functions. 
Petri net to model the transformation of the incident 
into accident, after reduction is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Model of serious incident 344/07 transformation into air traffic accident (after reduction of the states). 
 
This network may be treated as a generalized 
stochastic Petri net (GSPN). Its simulation analysis 
allows to observe some interesting relationships 
between a serious incident and the air traffic 
accident. It also allows to determine some 
quantitative dependencies. For example, in the 
given network one can distinguish 25 stable states 
and 17 vanishing states. The most important, from 
the perspective of the analysis presented in this 
article, are given in Table 1. Other states as well 
irrelevant places – were omitted. States M15, M19, 
M22, M23, M24 (called safe states) illustrate 
situations in which there is no accident. For 
example, in safe state M24 there is one marker in 
place p19 - B767 begins braking and one marker in 
place p22 - B737 stops. The transition to this state is 
possible by firing the immediate transition "B767 
interrupts” and the timed transition “B737 
interrupts take-off and stops" (Fig. 2). The joint 
probability of firing of these two transitions, and 
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the time at which this occurs can be easily 
determined both analytically and by simulation 
using a suitable software tool. In the present study a 
PIPE (Platform Independent Petri Net Editor) 
package was used. 
Table 1 shows also the mean residence times of 
the system in each state. They are the result of the 
assumed function of intensity of timed transitions 
and the probabilities of immediate transitions. For 
each of the stable states, the probability that the 
system reaches them was determined. The final joint 
probability that system reaches any of those safe 
states in this example equals 0.4. Of course this is 
only an estimate, the more accurate determination 
requires collecting relevant statistical data derived 
from measurements or expert assessments. 
Table 1. Selected states of the system 















M11  0  0  1  0  6,7 
M12  1  0  0  0  6,7 
M13  0  0  1  0  5 
M15  0  0  0  1  5 
M17  0  0  1  0  6,7 
M18  1  0  0  0  6,7 
M19  0  0  0  1  6,7 
M20  1  0  0  0  10 
M21  0  0  1  0  10 
M22  0  1  0  0  6,7 
M23  0  0  0  1  10 
M24  0  1  0  0  10 
Source: simulation results 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the paper the method of simulation analysis of 
the relationship between the air traffic serious 
incident and accident was presented. The starting 
point for this analysis was the assumption that a 
serious incident describes a situation in air traffic, 
in which only one additional adverse event  is 
sufficient to cause an accident. In the analyzed 
example (real air traffic incident), there are six 
scenarios, which lead to the transformation of an 
incident into accident. Simulation analysis, using 
generalized stochastic Petri nets, allowed to 
determine the probability of incident-accident 
conversion, which in this example is 0.6. 
This kind of analysis creates a general method 
for forecasting the number of accidents on the basis 
of the number of incidents (serious incidents) in air 
traffic. Development of such a method would be an 
important step towards the use of TLS concept in a 
practice of air traffic management. However, this is 
dependent on the repeatability of results for other 
aviation incidents. Verification of such relation is 
planned in the future. If it turns out, that for other 
air traffic events, the relationship between the 
incident an accident is of a similar nature, it would 
seem justified to try to formulate a general theorem 
in this regard. 
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